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Judicial Review of FDA Preemption Determinations
AMANDA FROST *
I. INTRODUCTION
In Medtronic v. Lohr,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Medical Device
Amendments2 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)3 did not preempt
Lohr's state tort claim for damages. Although the decision has caused lower courts to
think twice before holding that state tort laws are preempted by Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) regulations, it hardly has settled this area of law. In the time since
the Lohr decision, courts have disagreed sharply on the question of whether or not
FDA approval of medical devices preempts state law.
4
FDA has taken an active role in the debate. Most significantly, the agency has
issued regulations narrowly interpreting the scope of section 360k(a) of title 21 of the
United States Code - the express preemption provision at issue in the case5 - and
has filed amicus curiae briefs, in Lohr and in other cases, in support of its interpreta-
tion of section 360k(a). Recently, FDA issued a proposed regulation clarifying the
narrow reach of section 360k(a),6 but then rescinded its proposal in response to unfa-
vorable comments.'
It is unclear, however, what weight should be given to FDA's construction of the
preemption provisions in the FDCA. Normally an agency's interpretation of its own
statute is granted Chevron' deference: if the statute is ambiguous, courts will defer to
an agency's reasonable interpretation, even if the court itself would have reached a
different conclusion. In Lohr, the majority relied heavily on FDA's interpretation of
section 360k(a), commenting that FDA's narrow interpretation of the section's pre-
emptive reach "substantially informed" the Court's conclusion.9 As the four dissent-
ing justices pointed out, however, the majority never explicitly granted "Chevron def-
erence" to FDA's interpretation of the statute."0 In the dissenters' view, the majority
shied away from applying Chevron because "it is not certain that an agency regulation
determining the preemptive effect of any federal statute is entitled to deference."'
* Ms. Frost is the 1998-1999 Fuchsberg Fellow at the Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C.
The author wishes to thank Brian Wol fman for his very useful comments and suggestions on drafts of this article.
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
'518 U.S. 470 (1996).
2 Pub. L. No. 102-300, 106 Stat. 238 (1992) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 321, 331, 334, 346a,
352-353, 356-357, 360c-360d, 360g-360i, 360i notes, 3601, 360mm, 371-372, 372a, 376, 381 (1994); 42
U.S.C. § 262 (1994)).
3 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1994)).
4 Compare Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1997); Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d
737 (9th Cir. 1997); Lake v. TPLC, I F. Supp. 2d 84, 86-87 (D. Mass. 1998), with Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc.,
167 F.3d. 1367 (11 th Cir. 1999); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., Ill F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1997); Niehoffv. Surgidev,
950 S.W.2d 816,822 (Ky. 1997); Armstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Cal. App. 1996).
5 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1998).
6 62 Fed. Reg. 65,384 (Dec. 12, 1997) (amending 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)).
163 Fed. Reg. 39,789 (July 24, 1998).
8Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 495.
'Id. at 512.
"Id.
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This article addresses the weight courts should give to FDA's conclusions about
the preemptive effect of the FDCA, and the regulations it promulgates. The issue is a
complicated one. Although Congress has given FDA considerable authority to issue
regulations that may preempt state laws, thereby suggesting that Congress intended to
grant FDA authority to make preemption determinations, 2 it nevertheless is troubling
to require courts to defer to FDA's opinions on preemption in light of the well-estab-
lished judicial reluctance to displace state law. 3 Under Chevron, courts should defer
to agency interpretations of law only when traditional techniques of statutory inter-
pretation, including an awareness of the appropriate roles and capacities of courts and
agencies, make it apparent that Congress would have wanted courts to do so. 4 These
qualifications cut against granting Chevron deference to agency preemption determi-
nations. Agencies have no special expertise in interpreting state laws to determine
whether they conflict with federal laws. Moreover, there is a danger that agencies will
be too quick to decide that their governing statutes and regulations displace state law
because, unlike Congress, agencies are not accountable directly to the states, and there-
fore lack incentive to restrict their power to preserve state sovereignty. 5
Part II of this article reviews the theories underlying Chevron deference. Part III
examines the principles that govern courts' preemption determinations, and discusses
the problem of regulatory preemption. Part IV contains the author's views on the degree
to which courts should rely on agency preemption determinations. The article concludes
that courts should not defer to agencies when their preemption determinations purport
to interpret state laws, in part because agencies have no expertise in interpreting state
law, and in part because adopting agencies' construction of state laws is disrespectful to
state courts and legislatures, raising serious federalism concerns. Some deference is due,
however, to agencies' interpretations of the scope and effect of the statutes they admin-
ister and the regulations they promulgate, because agencies have the expertise and the
authority to make these determinations. In addition, it is always appropriate for courts to
defer to agencies' reasonable conclusions that their governing statute or regulations do
not displace state laws, because such conclusions do not raise the danger of overreach-
ing by agencies and do not impinge on state sovereignty. Finally, in part V the principles
developed in part IV are applied to judicial review of FDA preemption determinations
under sections 360k(a) and (b) of the FDCA.
II. THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING CHEVRON DEFERENCE
In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the U.S. Supreme Court made
it explicit that if a statute is unclear, courts should defer to the administering agency's
reasonable interpretation of the law. 6 The Court established a two-part test for review
of an agency's interpretation of its governing statute. The first inquiry is "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 7 To make this determi-
nation, courts should rely on traditional canons of statutory interpretation. Is If Con-
2 Id. at 506 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
14 See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 57 U.S. 735,741 (1996).
3See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992); see also Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. Rpv. 207 1,
2099-2100 (1990).
" Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
'7 Id. at 842.
" See id. at 843 n.9 (noting that courts should "employ traditional tools of statutory construction" in
determining if Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am.,
I 10 S. Ct. 929, 934 (1990); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 108 S. Ct. 413,
421 (1987); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,447-48 (1987).
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gress has made its intent clear, then there is no room for an alternative interpretation;
however, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute."19 The agency need only establish that its construction is "rea-
sonable in light of the Act's text, legislative history, and purpose."20 Although courts
have long granted some deference to administrative interpretations,2 Chevron estab-
lished the formal rule of deference, giving agencies the latitude to develop their own
interpretations of the statutes they administer.
Chevron has been viewed as a groundbreaking decision that significantly altered
the relationship between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of govern-
ment.22 The decision immediately was recognized as being at odds with the principle
first established in Marbury v. Madison23 that the judiciary alone has the authority to
"say what the law is."124 Indeed, Chevron has been characterized as the "counter-
Marbury" for the administrative state.25 Because Chevron altered the balance of power
between the branches of government, and particularly because it gave autonomy to the
"headless" fourth branch, the reasoning behind its rule of deference has been subject
to intense scrutiny.26 Over the years, courts and commentators have forwarded several
different theories to justify judicial deference to agency interpretations of the law.
One view justifies Chevron deference as a means of ensuring that policy choices
are made by politically accountable actors, thereby retaining the intended separation
of powers.27 Giving meaning to ambiguous statutes necessarily requires making policy
choices." Proponents of the separation of powers theory argue that, whenever pos-
sible, policy judgments should be made by those who can be held accountable, such as
elected officials, and not by judges who are insulated from the will of the people
through lifetime tenure and secure salaries.29 Agency officials are not elected directly
by the people, but they are subject to congressional oversight and, in executive agen-
cies, they are appointed and can be removed by the President.30 Although they are less
visible, and thus less accountable, than members of Congress or the President and
Vice President, agency officials feel the political pressure that judges are immune to.
As the Court in Chevron noted, judges, unlike agencies, "are not part of either politi-
cal branch of the Government," and thus "it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices - resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally
left to be resolved by the agency ..... 3
'1 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
20 Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 116 F.3d 507,511 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at
844. 2
' See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982); Union Elec. Co. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,626-27
(1971); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 246, 256 (1971); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45.
22 Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2074-75.
235 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
24 id. at 177.
21 Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2075.
26 In addition to hundreds of law review articles about Chevron, the case has been cited thousands of times
since it was decided in 1984. Id.
27 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. REG. 283, 307-09
(1986).
21 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864.
29 See Starr, supra note 27, at 307-09.
30 The heads of "independent" agencies are appointed for fixed terms and are not subject to plenary re-
moval power, and thus are insulated from influence by the executive branch.
1' Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
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An alternative theory for Chevron deference relies entirely on legislative intent.
If Congress is silent or unclear on an issue, it can be reasoned that Congress intended
the administering agency to make the final decision. As the Court stated in Chevron,
"[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delega-
tion of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regu-
lation."32 Therefore, courts are out of line when they fill gaps themselves rather than
leaving the task for the agency, as Congress intended.
From another perspective, Chevron deference operates as a default-rule against
which Congress legislates. Under this view congressional intent is unclear, not be-
cause Congress intended to confer all discretion to agencies, but rather because it
failed to think about the issue at all.33 The rule of deference created in Chevron is an
improvement on past practice because it provides certainty: Congress knows that if it
fails to consider and resolve certain problems, those problems will be resolved not by
the courts, but by an agency with policy biases that Congress is familiar with.3 4
Agency expertise is perhaps the most frequently cited rationale for Chevron defer-
ence. Unlike agencies, "[j]udges are not experts in the field."35 As Justice Stevens wrote
in Chevron, the "principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been con-
sistently followed by this Court whenever ... a full understanding of the force of the
statutory policy in a given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations."36 Agencies are experts because
their personnel usually have special training and significant experience in a particular
field. Courts cannot match agencies' collective knowledge of their specialty. Because
they have an institutional memory of the success and failure of past policies, agencies
are uniquely situated to understand the consequences of their actions.37
A common thread through these rationalizations is that agencies, unlike courts,
are more apt to reach the "correct" outcome by interpreting statutory ambiguities as
Congress actually intended, or as Congress would have wanted them to be resolved
had it thought about the issue. In other words, an agency's reasonable interpretation
of an ambiguous statute supersedes a reviewing court's interpretation because agen-
cies are more likely to get it right. Another theme to these rationales is that agencies,
which qualify as one of the political branches of government,38 are the more appropri-
ate institution to interpret ambiguous statutes.
Chevron has transformed the relationship between the judiciary and adminis-
trative agencies. The rule of deference has been applied expansively - at times
more expansively than Justice Stevens, the author of the opinion, ever intended.39 In
fleshing out the principle of deference established by Chevron, courts have chosen
to apply it broadly, finding that it is for agencies, not courts, to make decisions
regarding the meaning of their governing statutes.4 0 Fifteen years after Chevron, it
is unquestioned that deference is required whenever an agency construes some am-
biguous aspect of its governing statute - that is, deference is required in most
administrative law cases.
32 Id. at 843-44.
31 Antonin Scalia, Judicial De/erence to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
516-17.
" See id.
31 Chevtrm, 467 U.S. at 865.
36 Id. at 844.
," United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
31 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
3' See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446-48; see also Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476
U.S. 974,984-88 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
41 Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2074-76.
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Commentators, however, have criticized blanket application of the deference prin-
ciple, arguing that courts should defer to agencies only when agencies are better situ-
ated to fulfill statutory goals .4 Some courts have agreed, refusing to defer under cir-
cumstances that suggest that the courts, and not the agency, are more likely to realize
Congress' intent. For example, courts have questioned whether Chevron deference is
merited when an agency's position is developed for the first time in litigation, and
thus may lack the "fair and considered" judgment of agency officials.4 2 Some courts
have refused to defer to agency interpretations of the scope of their jurisdiction, in
light of agencies' obvious self-interest in expanding their jurisdiction beyond what
Congress intended.4 3 Nor will courts defer, despite statutory ambiguity, when agency
actions raise constitutional questions.'
III. THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION
The preemption of state law by federal agencies - commonly referred to as regu-
latory preemption - has been recognized by courts4" and commentators 46 as a special
circumstance under which Chevron deference might be inappropriate. The framers of
the U.S. Constitution intended for the states to retain autonomous governments that
would operate alongside the newly created federal government.4 ' There has been de-
bate about the scope of authority retained by the states, and the limits on federal
intrusion into state affairs. 41 Although the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution pro-
vides the federal government with the power to displace state laws in areas in which
the federal government is permitted to act,49 courts have been reluctant to find such
preemption unless Congress clearly has expressed its intent to do so.5"
41 Id.; Steven Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 373
(1986); Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron '
Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L. REV. 255, 260-61 (1988); Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of
Power in the Administrative State, 89COLUM. L. REV. 452,475-78 (1989).42 See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 997 F. Supp. 56,66 (D.D.C.
1998) (noting that litigating positions may be unreliable evidence of an agency's policy); see also KENNETH C.
DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5 (3d ed. 1994).
11 See The Bus. Roundtable v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 905 F.2d 406, 413-14 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
New York Shipping Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Supreme
Court has been unclear about whether courts should defer to agencies on jurisdictional questions. See, e.g.,
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 110 S. Ct.
1384, 1391 (1990).
"See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958); DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607,645-46 (1980); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979).
41 See, e.g., Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 998 (11 th Cir. 1996).
46 Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice With Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Pre-
emption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823 (1995); Damien J. Marshall, The Application of Chevron Deference in
Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87 GEO. L.J. 263 (1998).
41 See THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring to the "sovereign power" of the states), No.
45 (James Madison) (affirming that the states will retain a significant degree of sovereignty), No. 51 (James
Madison) (assuring the preservation of the states as "distinct governments") (B. Wright ed., 1961).
48 See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERAL-
iSM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
49 
"It is basic to this constitutional command that all conflicting state provisions be without effect." Mary-
land v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316,427 (1819)).
10 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act does not preempt state law requiring mandatory retirement of appointed state judges at 70);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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A. Preemption Doctrine
Under the federal system, the federal government and the states govern concur-
rently, subject to the limitations of the Supremacy Clause." The Supremacy Clause
provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... and any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary Notwithstanding."52 As Justice
Marshall first stated in Gibbons v. Ogden, state laws that "interfere with or are con-
trary to, the laws of Congress" are preempted by federal law, and thus must be struck
down.53
Although Congress, when acting pursuant to its constitutional authority,54 has
the power to preempt state laws, courts have had difficulty determining when Con-
gress intends to utilize that power. To aid in this endeavor, courts have identified three
types of preemption: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption.5
Express preemption occurs when Congress expressly has stated its intent to displace
state law.56 When state and federal laws conflict, preemption is implied. 7 Likewise,
preemption is implied if federal law pervades an entire field, indicating congressional
intent to occupy the field exclusively. The bottom line in all preemption cases is
whether Congress intended to preempt the competing state law.59
Conflict preemption is the focus of much of this article. There are two types of
conflict preemption: direct conflict preemption and obstacle preemption.6" Direct con-
flict preemption occurs when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility."'" For example, if FDA enacts a regulation requiring hearing
aids to have a wire-width of two inches, but Florida enacts a law requiring a wire-width
of three inches, hearing aid manufacturers could not obey both laws, and therefore the
state law would be in direct conflict and would have to yield to its federal counterpart.62
Obstacle preemption is less clear-cut. It occurs "when state law 'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."' 63 State law is preempted even if it is possible to obey the command of
both federal and state law, because the state law may undermine the purpose of the
federal statute. Usually, obstacle preemption arises in cases where a state imposes a
stricter standard than the federal law. 4 For example, a state may require drug manu-
5' See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,459 (1990).52This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treatise made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, and any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
13 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1,211 (1824); see also Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,
604 (1991).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Constitution also guarantees certain rights to the states with which Congress
cannot interfere. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art IV, § 3 (guaranteeing states' territorial integrity).
11 Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); Irving v. Mazda Motor
Corp., 136 F.3d 764, 767 (11 th Cir. 1998); see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
16 Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713 ("[W]hen acting within constitutional limits, Congress is em-
powered to preempt state law by so stating in express terms.").
17 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
11 See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 464 U.S. 238,248 (1994).
9 See, e.g., Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
f See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248; McGreal, supra note 46, at 832.
bl Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
62 This hypothetical is borrowed from Justice Breyer. Medironic, 518 U.S. at 504.
63 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248; see also Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
" See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. 683, 689 (1987); Rice, 331 U.S. at 241
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 172-73 (1942) (Stone, C.J.,
dissenting).
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facturers to develop a more detailed warning label than federal law or FDA regula-
tions require, or may insist that drugs only be used for the purposes for which they are
tested, while federal law permits off-label use. State law and federal law can co-exist,
but the state law may undercut one of the purposes of the federal law. FDA's decision
to limit the contents of the warning label, or to allow off-label use, may reflect the
agency's careful balance of health and safety concerns with the need to streamline the
process by which new drugs and devices can reach the market. Requiring manufactur-
ers to clear more hurdles before the product can be marketed could upset the compro-
mise struck in the federal law and regulations, and thus the state law presents an
impermissible obstacle to the achievement of the federal purpose.
When faced with either direct conflict preemption or obstacle preemption, re-
viewing courts must compare state and federal law.65 Direct conflict cases are straight-
forward: the reviewing court's task is to determine if the letter of the state law con-
flicts with the letter of the federal law. Cases concerning obstacle preemption, on the
other hand, require courts to determine if the state law interferes with the realization
of the federal law's purpose.
6
B. The Presumption Against Preemption
The Supremacy Clause leaves no doubt that Congress has the power to preempt
state law. 67 At the same time, the preemption of state and local law threatens the Tenth
Amendment principle of federalism.68 The Tenth Amendment provides that "the pow-
ers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."
On their faces, the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment appear to comple-
ment, rather than conflict with, one another. The Supremacy Clause establishes the
superiority of federal laws in those areas in which the Constitution permits the federal
government to act, and the Tenth Amendment provides that, until preempted by fed-
eral law, states also can exercise control in these areas. In practice, however, it can be
difficult to determine whether state law is preempted by federal law. The Constitution
only permits preemption of state law when Congress intends to preempt, otherwise
the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states the right to legislate even in those areas in
which Congress also has spoken. If a court determines that state law is preempted
when Congress did not wish it so, the court has violated the states' Tenth Amendment
right to retain all powers to govern, save those prohibited to it by the Constitution.
'5 See, e.g., Teper, 82 F.3d at 993.6 Rice, 331 U.S. at 231.
A forceful argument is made here for the view that the Illinois regulatory scheme should be allowed
to supplement the Federal Act and that the Illinois Commission should not be prevented from acting
on any of the matters covered by Rice's complaint, unless what the Commission does runs counter in
fact to the federal policy. That is to say, the actual operation of the state system may be harmonious
with the "measure of control" over warehousemen which the Federal Act imposes. That, it is said,
can only be determined after the Illinois Commission has acted .... [U]ntil it is known what the
Commission will do, no conflict with the Federal Act can be shown.
Id. (citations omitted).
" See Rice, 331 U.S. at 229-30 ("It is clear that since warehouses engaged in the storage of grain for
interstate or foreign commerce are in the federal domain, Congress may, if it chooses, take unto itself all regula-
tory authority over them, share the task with the states, or adopt as federal policy state scheme of regulation.")
(citation omitted). James Madison told the members of the First Congress "Interference with the power of the
States was no constitutional criterion of the power of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress could not
exercise it; ifgiven, they might exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of
the states." 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1897 (1791).
6s See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.
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As discussed above, Congress expressly can preempt state law, or it can do so
impliedly by enacting legislation that conflicts directly with state law, or to which
state law is an obstacle to the realization of the federal law's purpose. Indeed, state law
is preempted even if it does not conflict with federal law if it can be inferred that
Congress intended to "occupy the field" onto which the state law intrudes. In cases in
which Congress' intention to preempt competing state law arises from inference rather
than from its stated intention, courts are caught in the conundrum created by the
Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment. On one hand, if a court holds that the
state law is not preempted, it risks foiling the legislative purpose, thereby violating
the Supremacy Clause's prescription that federal law overrides competing state laws.
On the other hand, if a court is too quick to nullify state laws that could operate in
unison with the federal law, then the court has infringed needlessly on state autonomy
in violation of the Tenth Amendment.
Arguably, the first type of error is less egregious than the second. If a court erro-
neously lets a competing state law stand, Congress can correct the mistake by clarify-
ing its intention to preempt state laws. If a court erroneously finds that federal law
preempts state law, however, the state cannot rectify the error and Congress has little
incentive to do so.69 As a result, courts have demonstrated an "overriding reluctance
to infer preemption in ambiguous cases."7 Before the federal government existed,
and before it began actively regulating interstate commerce, the states policed the
activities of their citizens. As the Supreme Court stated in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corporation,71 when it comes to preemption, the Court "start[s] with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 7 2 By operating under
this assumption, the Court hopes to ensure that "the federal-state balance will not be
disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts."73
Another reason, usually unstated, for courts to hesitate before preempting state
law is to slow the transfer of authority from the states to the federal government. The
Supremacy Clause permits preemption of state law only when Congress has acted
within the enumerated powers set forth in article I of the Constitution. The expansive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause that developed over the first half of the cen-
tury, combined with the rapid growth of the administrative state, has allowed Con-
gress to regulate, in the words of one commentator, "all significant human activity."74
Although recent Supreme Court decisions have attempted to set some limits on the
scope of Congress' Commerce Clause powers,75 it is fair to say that there exists no
identifiable sphere of activities reserved to the states alone, and thus no piece of state
legislation that is not at risk of being preempted by a competing federal law. In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court's apparent abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine has
allowed Congress to delegate its authority to regulate to hundreds of agencies, greatly
McGreal, supra note 46, at 846-47.
o L. TRIM, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 479; see also Chicago & N.W. Tr. Co. v. Kalo Brick
& Tile, 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142.
" Rice, 331 U.S. 218 (1947)
71 Id. at 230.
"' Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (citations and quotations omitted) (citing United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
14 See Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstractions, 69 U. CHi. L. Ri;.V 317,322 (1992) (describing how the
Court's abstraction of commercial competition allowed Congress to place "all significant human activity" within
the constitutional grasp of the Commerce Clause); see also McGreal, supra note 46, at 827 n.22 ("Given the
presently expansive reading of the Commerce Clause, it is hardly conceivable that the Court would deny Con-
gress the power to regulate a subject matter because it was unrelated to interstate commerce.").
" Printz, 521 U.S. at 898; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549; New York, 505 U.S. at 144.
374 VOL. 54
1999 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FDA PREEMPTION DETERMINATIONS 375
expanding the reach of federal law. The presumption against preemption may be one
of the judiciary's few remaining tools with which to protect state sovereignty from
encroaching federal authority. 6 Although there are few, if any, areas where states
have primary authority, courts have strived to allow states room to govern until the
federal government has made clear its intent to regulate the area.
An additional cause for concern is that preemption may strip individuals of long-
standing remedies available under state law. Often, the plaintiff claims an injury that
only state law or the common law can remedy. If a court finds state law preempted, the
injured party is left without recourse. By raising preemption as a defense, the defen-
dant is arguing that through the federal enactment, Congress intended to remove
these individual rights and remedies that had been available under state law or the
common law. Because it is unlikely Congress intended such a result, courts shy away
from preempting state law when there is no federal remedy for the alleged wrong."
Thus, to safeguard state sovereignty and injured citizens' remedies, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that there is no preemption of state law unless it is the "clear
and manifest purpose of Congress"78 to do so. 9 Congressional intent to preempt is
evidenced by persuasive federal regulations that leave no room for states to act, by the
dominant federal interest concerned, by an irreconcilable conflict between state and
federal law, or by a clear statement from Congress to that effect.80 In short, before
preempting state laws, courts must find either that Congress clearly expressed its
intent to preempt state law or that preemption is necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
federal law. In either circumstance, the reviewing court applies the presumption against
preemption to ensure that it is not disturbing the federal-state balance needlessly, but
is following the clear intent of Congress.
The presumption against preemption has been called a "clear statement rule."8
Courts apply clear statement rules in a number of contexts, most notably to avoid
deciding constitutional questions. 3 In part, courts shy away from deciding constitu-
tional issues because judicial pronouncements on the Constitution can be reversed
only through the amendment process, or a judicial about-face. Thus, erroneous deci-
sions on constitutional questions are more difficult to undo than erroneous interpreta-
tions of statutes. This policy also decreases the number of constitutional amendments
and judicial reversals on constitutional questions, each of which can weaken the au-
thority of the Constitution. In addition, by reading statutes to evade constitutional
questions, courts avoid conflicts with the other branches of the federal government, as
well as with state governments." Less offense will be taken by Congress and the states
if courts interpret statutes narrowly, instead of adopting a broad interpretation that
76 After noting that the Supreme Court no longer enforces the nondelegation doctrine with much vigor,
Professor Sunstein writes that "in the wake of the downfall of that doctrine, the use of constitutionally based clear
statement principles serves as a narrower and more targeted means of ensuring that Congress, rather than bureau-
crats, will deliberate on questions that raise serious constitutional difficulties or intrude into constitutionally
sensitive areas." Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2111-12.
" See, e.g., Symens v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 152 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that it is
"most reluctant" to infer a preemptive intent that would leave vaccine purchasers and users without any rem-
edy); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,486-87 (1996) (plurality opinion); Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
76 See, e.g., New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995); Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
715 (1985); Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
79Rice, 331 U.S. at 230
80 Id.
SI SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 3.
8 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
13 DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575; NLRB, 440 U.S. at 499-501.
4 DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575.
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requires striking them down. Finally, requiring Congress and state legislatures to
speak clearly on constitutional matters ensures that they will have considered the
gravity of the issue before acting.
Labeling the presumption against preemption a "clear statement rule" is only
partially accurate, however. By definition, a finding of "express preemption" requires
that Congress clearly state its intent to negate state law, but conflict and field preemp-
tion arise from the implication that Congress would have wanted the letter of its laws
fully carried out and the purpose of its laws fully realized. When courts find that
preemption of state law is implied, essentially they are adding a codicil to the statute
declaring that any state law that impedes the federal statute must give way. Although
this is a logical inference, there has been no "clear statement" from Congress on the
matter."
In any case, the rationale for the presumption against preemption differ from the
rationales underlying clear statement rules. The chief distinction is that although no
branch of government has the authority to enact laws that violate the Constitution,
Congress does have the authority to preempt state law when it chooses. Courts inter-
pret statutes to elude constitutional questions to save other branches of government
from committing constitutional error.8 5 In contrast, the presumption against preemp-
tion appears to be a judicial strategy to avoid constitutional error by the courts, rather
than by Congress. If Congress did not intend to preempt state law, and a court errone-
ously holds that it did, then the court has violated the state's Tenth Amendment right
to govern in the interstices of federal law.86
The presumption against preemption serves the additional purpose of forcing
Congress to play the central role in protecting the sovereignty of the states.8 7 In Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,"s the Supreme Court held that state
sovereignty is "more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the struc-
ture of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." 9
The Court explained that the states' interests are protected through their constitu-
tional role as units of political power: members of Congress are elected by states or
portions of states, not by regions of the country; the President and Vice President are
elected by the electoral college, in which candidates compete to win each state rather
than a majority of the population of the entire country; and, most important, the states
are represented equally in the Senate, and no state can be deprived of that representa-
tion without first giving its consent."° James Madison viewed this last provision as the
"constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual
States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty.""' States also ex-
ercise indirect influence over the U.S. House of Representatives through control of
electoral qualifications."2 As Madison saw it, the federal government "will partake
sufficiently of the spirit [of the States] to be disinclined to invade the rights of the
individual States, or the prerogatives of their governments."93
15 Id. ("The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally
protected liberties or usurp powers constitutionally forbidden it.").
16 The issue is not whether Congress intended to preempt, but whether it has the power to preempt; then the
question is analyzed under the clear statement rule for questionable congressional enactments.
'7 TRIBE, supra note 70, §§ 5-7, 5-8, 5-20-5-23, 6-26.
"469 U.S. at 528.
"Id. at 552.
o Id. at 551; U.S. CONST. art 1, §3, art. V.
" THE FI:DERALIST No. 62, at 408 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961).
' U.S. CONST. art I, § 2.
" TIE FEDIRALIST No. 46, at 332 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961).
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The judiciary, on the other hand, is ill-equipped to protect state sovereignty. The
judicial process requires that courts develop principles applicable to a wide range of
cases. Finding such principles to protect the federal-state balance has proven difficult.
As Justice Blackmun wrote in Garcia, "[w]hat has proved problematic is not the per-
ception that the Constitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the Commerce
Clause, but rather the nature and content of those limitations."94 Justice Blackmun
initially believed the Court capable of developing standards to limit Congress' Com-
merce Clause powers, but he reversed himself- thereby providing the fifth vote to
reverse the closely divided Court - after concluding that courts lack the ability to
"identify principled constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress' Commerce
Clause powers over the States .... ,9
By presuming that Congress does not intend to preempt state law and construing
statutes accordingly, courts force Congress to make its intent to displace state law
"clear and manifest," thus ensuring that the preemption of state law is deliberate and
made with the full knowledge of both the legislative and executive branches. Presum-
ably, those branches will keep the interests of the states in mind when considering
whether to abrogate state law. Courts assist the states by displacing state law only in
cases in which it is impossible to obey state and federal law, or in cases in which the
state law undermines the federal purpose. Presumably, the possibility of such conflicts
with state law were foreseen by members of Congress voting to enact the legislation,
and thus the states' interests were considered when the law was enacted. By requiring
Congress to speak clearly when expressly preempting state law and by narrowly con-
struing "conflicts" between state and federal law, courts force Congress to take full
responsibility for the preemption of state law.
C. Regulatory Preemption
Regulatory preemption - the preemption of state law by regulations promul-
gated by federal agencies - creates a special set of problems. These problems are
evident particularly in the area of food and drug law, where Congress has delegated
much of its lawmaking authority to FDA. FDA has promulgated a detailed set of
regulations governing the sale of foods, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices, and its
personnel review new products to ensure they meet agency standards. Absent the
ability to delegate to FDA, it is unlikely that Congress could ensure that products are
safe and effective for their intended use. Clearly, the Commerce Clause permits Con-
gress to regulate the interstate sale of foods and drugs. Just as clearly, the states have
an interest in protecting their citizens from threats to their health and their pocket-
books. Indeed, the states are acting pursuant to their "historic police powers" when
protecting the health and safety of their citizens,9 6 and courts have taken care not to
unnecessarily usurp the states' traditional role. 7 How then, should courts react when
FDA promulgates regulations that preempt state law?
" Garcia, 469 U.S. at 468.
-5 Id. at 469.
16 See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2245 ("Throughout our history the several States have exercised their
police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens." Because these are "primarily, and historically,.
.. matter[s] of local concern .... ); Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 719 ("States traditionally have had great
latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of
all persons.").
" See, e.g., Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
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As the Supreme Court repeatedly has held, "[f]ederal regulations have no less
preemptive effect than federal statutes.'"" Agencies have the power to preempt even if
Congress failed to expressly authorize them to displace state law.99 Regulatory pre-
emption is suspect only to the degree that any lawmaking by administrative agencies
is suspect. Because it is now well-established that agencies have the authority to make
law, the preemptive effect of agency-made law should be equally valid.
Nevertheless, agency preemption of state law raises difficult questions for review-
ing courts. How should courts apply the presumption against preemption to agency
regulations? Should it matter to the reviewing court whether Congress expressly or
impliedly delegated the authority to preempt? Finally, should courts apply Chevron
deference to agency determinations that their governing statute permits preemption
just as they would to other agency interpretations of their governing statutes?
The federalism concerns underlying the presumption against preemption are just
as strong in the context of regulatory preemption. State sovereignty is no less dimin-
ished because it is an agency, and not Congress, that is doing the preempting. In fact,
preemption by agencies may prove a greater hindrance to the states' ability to govern
their affairs than preemption by congressional enactment. In part, this is because
agencies can promulgate far more comprehensive and detailed regulations than Con-
gress - with its limited number of members, lack of expertise, and broad authority -
would have the time and inclination to do."'
In addition, agencies are a step removed from the political safeguards of federal-
ism that courts rely on to protect state sovereignty. Unlike Congress, agencies are not
directly accountable to the states. The heads of agencies are appointed, not elected.
Agency decision makers may have little or no connection to the states, and can make
decisions without first obtaining state input. Although agencies are accountable to
Congress, which controls their budget and defines their mandate, agencies are one-
step removed from the pressures and influences that states can exert on members of
Congress and the executive branch.'
Thus the presumption against preemption should apply to agency preemption
determinations. Courts have had difficulty, however, reconciling that presumption
with the Chevron deference normally granted agency interpretations of their govern-
ing statutes. For the most part, courts have chosen to avoid the issue - either being so
vague as to leave the question unresolved or sidestepping it completely. For example,
in Medtronic v. Lohr, the Supreme Court was conflicted about whether Chevron re-
quired it to defer to FDA's interpretation of the preemptive scope of the Medical De-
vice Amendments to the FDCA."°2 Although the five-member majority discussed FDA's
preemption regulations and noted that Congress had delegated substantial discretion
to FDA to determine whether particular state laws were preempted by the federal
regulatory scheme, the majority did not apply the two-step Chevron analysis that nor-
mally precedes a discussion of an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute.
" Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984).
Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982) ("A pre-emptive regulation's
force does depend on express congressional authorization to displace state law.") (citing United States v. Shimer,
367 U.S. 374, 381-83 (1961)).
""0 See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA.
L. Riiv. 253,254-60 (1986).
"M Marshall, supra note 45, at 278.
"",. Compare Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 505-07 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that absent clear congres-
sional command as to preemption, administrative agencies have a "degree of leeway" to determine which admin-
istrative actions has preemptive effect) with 518 U.S. at 512 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that Chevron
deference is unwarranted).
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Moreover, the majority repeatedly stated that its preemption determination rested "pri-
marily" on "a fair understanding of congressional purpose,"°3 and not that of FDA.
The dissenters, in turn, pointed out that the majority never explicitly granted Chevron
deference to FDA's regulations interpreting the FDCA. Indeed, the majority ques-
tioned whether such deference would have been appropriate. The issue has not been
taken up again by the Supreme Court, and remains unresolved.
IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND THE
PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION
To decide what deference, if any, to give agency preemption determinations, the
principles underlying Chevron deference must be analyzed in conjunction with the
principles underlying the presumption against preemption. As discussed in part II,
Chevron deference is based on theories regarding agency expertise, agency account-
ability, and congressional intent. The presumption against preemption is derived from
concerns for federalism, a reluctance to deprive citizens of the protection of state laws,
and the desire to make Congress take responsibility for the preemption of state laws. If
these doctrines of judicial decisionmaking are given blanket application, without
thought as to whether they are fulfilling their underlying purposes, they inevitably
will clash. If applied selectively to further their respective interests, however, they are
reconcilable.
A. Accountability
Agencies' political accountability, and the courts' lack thereof, is one of the bases
for deferring to agencies' interpretations of their governing statutes. As the Court
wrote in Chevron,
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Execu-
tive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Govern-
ment to make such policy choices - resolving the competing interests that
Congress either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be re-
solved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of
everyday realities. °4
In the preemption context, however, it is not only political accountability that
matters, but accountability specifically to the states as units of political power within
the federal system. In Garcia, the Court explained that it was abandoning its previous
efforts to protect state sovereignty through judicially-crafted limitations on Congress'
Commerce Clause powers because it believed state interests were protected by the
"structure of the Federal government itself."' °5 Locating agency preemption power in
ambiguous federal statutes undermines the structural safeguards of federalism. Con-
gress' failure to authorize an agency to preempt state laws could mean that it did not
foresee the possibility of preemption. Alternatively, Congress may have left the lan-
guage of the statute ambiguous because it wanted the agency to make the final deci-
sion on the issue. Under Chevron, such lack of foresight, or intentional indecision, is
103 Id. at 2250 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530 n.27) (emphasis in original).
11 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
o Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51.
380 FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL VOL. 54
viewed as an invitation to the agency to fill the "gaps" in the statute. In contrast, the
presumption against preemption requires reading an ambiguous statute as a bar to
preemption, because state laws should only be displaced by a deliberative act of Con-
gress, in which the states' interests are represented and taken into account. 6 Indeed,
a recognized benefit of the presumption against preemption is that it prevents the
legislative and executive branches from evading responsibility for displacing state
laws. 7 Where the preemption of state law is concerned, congressional silence or
ambiguity should not lead automatically to the conclusion that the agency is empow-
ered to act in Congress' stead.'
Agencies, however, are not completely insulated from the political influence of
the states. As the Court noted in Chevron, all agencies are accountable to Congress,
which oversees their activities and controls their budgets. Executive agencies are also
accountable to the President, who appoints their top personnel and maintains some
control over policymaking.0 9 Agencies are thus subject, at least indirectly, to the po-
litical pressures applied to Congress and the executive branch by the states. To the
degree that the legislative and executive branches are persuaded to protect state sover-
eignty, agencies will feel some pressure to do the same. Thus, the states have an oppor-
tunity to make their concerns known to agencies through Congress, through directives
from the executive, or through comments submitted directly to agencies on proposed
regulations. As a result, even though agency rulemakings lack some of the political
safeguards of federalism that are present when a bill preempting state law is passed,
agencies are not immune completely from pressure to act in the states' interests.
Nevertheless, regulatory preemption should not be equated with statutory pre-
emption and its attendant opportunities for states to protect their interests. When an
agency is affirmatively asserting the authority to preempt state law, courts should not
defer unless the agency has given notice of its intention and provided an opportunity
for interested persons to comment. Normally, courts grant Chevron deference to agency
interpretations of their governing statute as long as those interpretations reflect the
agency's "fair and considered judgment on the matter;"' 0 there is no requirement that
agencies undertake formal notice and comment before deference is accorded."' Thus,
courts have deferred to agencies' litigating positions, and to informal articulations of
agency policy in letters or policy statements." 2 Decisions by an agency to preempt
state law, however, should be subject to a higher standard. If an agency has formulated
its preemption determination without notice and comment - such as in a nonbinding
policy statement or a preamble to a regulation - then the political safeguards of
federalism are absent and reviewing courts should take care to attend to the federalism
concerns that otherwise might be neglected.
" See TRIBE, supra note 70, at 480 ("to give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congres-
sional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states'
interests") (emphasis in original); The Supreme Court, 1987 Term -Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143,
296 (1988) ("A rule that distills displacement of state law from congressional silence divests states of even
Garcia s slender procedural guarantee.") (emphasis in original). Cf California State Bd. of Optometry v. Fed-
eral Trade Comm'n, 910 F.2d 976,981-82 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (refusing to defer to the Federal Trade Commission's
argument that it could issue rules interfering with sovereign acts of states in the face of congressional silence
because to do so would "short-circuit the protections offered States by the political process").
107 See id.
o'Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251 (finding Congress' silence on the preemption question to be significant).
'o9 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
N0 Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 117 F.3d 607,613 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Auer v. Robbins,
117 S. Ct. 905, 912 (1997)).
111 Id.
,2 See id.
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In the past, courts have expressed concern about the formality of agency action in
the preemption context. In Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association, the Su-
preme Court had to decide whether the Federal Home Loan Bank board regulations
allowing federal savings and loan associations to use the due-on-sale clauses in their
mortgage contracts preempted a California law prohibiting such clauses." 3 The pre-
amble that accompanied the Board's regulations permitting use of due-on-sale clauses
stated that "Federal [savings and loan] associations shall not be bound by or subject to
any conflicting State law which imposes different ... due-on-sale requirements ... "I"
Although the Court used this expressed intention to preempt as support for its conclu-
sion that the regulation conflicted with - and thus preempted - state law, the Court
was careful to note that it was not relying on the preamble alone as a basis for its
decision, because the preamble had not been subject to notice and comment and it
lacked the force of law. Similarly, in United States v. Walter Dunlop & Sons, Inc.,"'
the Third Circuit held that state law governed the status of a lien on collateral for a
loan made by the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), despite an FmHA regula-
tion that conflicted with state law. The regulation at issue was an interpretive rule,
promulgated without notice and comment, and thus lacked the force and effect of
law." 6 The court concluded that interpretive rules "do not constitute the sort of ex-
plicit 'congressional directive' that will displace the application of state law ... "I"
There are two reasons to require agencies to act formally through notice and
comment before granting any deference to their preemption determinations. First,
formal agency action will ensure that the "political safeguards of federalism" have a
chance to work. Agencies are accountable indirectly to the states, whose interests are
represented by the legislative and executive branches, and agencies also can be influ-
enced by direct input from the states. The states' influence over agencies is at its
weakest when agencies take informal action. If agencies have not provided notice that
they have taken a stand regarding preemption or given interested persons an opportu-
nity to comment, the legislative and executive branches, as well as the states, will be
unable to make their preferences known. Moreover, by failing to provide for a period
of public comment, agencies lack the input from states that might persuade them that
preemption is unnecessary or unwarranted. In short, informal agency action deprives
states of the political influence that protects states from federal overreaching.
Second, when agencies preempt state law informally, they show a lack of respect for
state sovereignty. Although federal agencies have the power to preempt, they should not
do so cavalierly, without the long deliberation that accompanies the promulgation of a
legally-binding rule. State laws deserve the respect of federal agencies. These laws are
enacted by democratically elected state legislatures. Oftentimes, the state laws threat-
ened by preemption concern the health and safety of the state's citizens - an area that
traditionally has been the domain of the states. Moreover, usually it is not just one state
whose laws are threatened, but a number of states that have similar laws on the books. In
" 458 U.S. at 141.
I"4 1d. at 158.
"5 800 F.2d 1232 (3d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1238.
"7 Id. at 1239. Without noting any conflict with its previous decision in Walter Dunlop & Sons, a split
panel of the Third Circuit preempted state law on the ground that it conflicted with an interpretive rule issued by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See, e.g., Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61
F.3d 170, 182 (3d. Cir. 1995). The majority defended its decision by noting that Chevron deference applies to
informal, as well as formal, agency action, but failed to consider the possibility that deference to agency preemp-
tion determination taken without notice and comment, even if appropriate in other contexts, is at odds with the
rationale underlying the presumption against preemption. See id. at 182, 196 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
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contrast to state law makers, the decision makers in federal agencies are appointed, not
elected. Agency officials lack knowledge of the special circumstances that exist in the
individual states. Allowing agencies to preempt state law without notice and comment
creates needless friction between the states and the federal government, and deprives
citizens of the protection from state laws that they expect.
If agencies use informal means to declare their intent not to preempt state law,
however, neither of the above two concerns apply. Because the states lose nothing by
an agency determination that federal law does not displace state law, they need not
participate in such decisions. Nor does an agency show any lack of respect for the
states when it informally concludes that state laws should be left in place. Thus, an
informal agency statement that it does not intend to preempt state law should be granted
the same deference as any "fair and considered" agency judgment would be accorded
under Chevron.
B. Default Rule
Another rationale for Chevron deference is that it serves as a default rule against
which Congress legislates. According to this theory, when Congress is ambiguous or
silent, it is not explicitly delegating policy decisions to the agencies, but rather has
failed to foresee the issue at all or has failed to gather a majority to support one
position or another."' Establishing the rule of deference is useful because it provides
certainty - Congress knows that if it fails to be clear, the agency entrusted with
administering the statute will make the final decision. Because Congress has some
idea of the policy preferences and biases of the agencies for which it legislates, Con-
gress knows how an unclear statute likely will be interpreted." 9
The default rule theory for deference is at odds with preemption doctrine. If Con-
gress failed to foresee the possibility of preempting state law, then there was no clear
intent on Congress' part to authorize the agency to do so. Without congressional in-
tent to preempt, or congressional delegation of the preemption power, agencies are
acting on their own initiative when preempting state law. Preempting state law is
substantively different from general agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, or
agency policymaking to fill statutory gaps. To defer to an agency's conclusion that
preemption is within its mandate, when Congress never decided the issue, would
violate the states' Tenth Amendment right to regulate the activities of their citizens.
Even more problematic is the idea that Congress left the statute ambiguous be-
cause it could not form a coalition to vote in favor, or against, the delegation of pre-
emption power to the agency. If Congress cannot muster a majority to support pre-
emption, then allowing the agency to preempt state law regardless is at odds with the
rationale underlying the presumption against preemption. Indeed, under such cir-
cumstances, deference to an agency's conclusion that it is authorized to preempt state
law creates a presumption in favor of preemption. If agencies are permitted to pre-
empt state law even when a majority of Congress refused to speak in favor of it, then
deferring to agency preemption determinations is equivalent to finding congressional
intent to preempt in the absence of a clear statement to the contrary. Such an outcome
conflicts with the Tenth Amendment's prohibition against unnecessarily interfering
with the autonomy of the states.
Deference is appropriate even when Congress "simply did not consider the question at this level" or
when "Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
"' See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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Again, these federalism concerns do not arise when agencies interpret their gov-
erning statutes to avoid preempting state law. An agency's decisions not to preempt
reads congressional ambiguity or silence as a bar to preemption of state law, letting
Congress know that if it wishes a particular agency to displace state law, it must
delegate that power clearly and without reservation. Such a judgment by an agency
merits Chevron deference. By deferring to agency decisions not to preempt, courts
promote the policies behind the presumption against preemption because Congress
will quickly come to realize that without a clear delegation the agency will let state
law stand and the courts will affirm the agency's interpretation.
C. Expertise
Agency expertise, one of the most frequently cited rationales for Chevron defer-
ence, fails to justify blanket deference to agency preemption determinations. Agencies
are granted deference when construing their governing statutes because they under-
stand how the statutes work in practice, and because Congress intended, or at least
was aware, that agencies would fill in the missing gaps. Most preemption determina-
tions, however, require agencies to construe state law, and then determine if these
laws conflict with federal law. Agencies have no comparable familiarity with state
laws, nor are they the institution entrusted with applying those laws. State agencies,
legislatures, and courts, not federal agencies, are experts on their own laws. State and
local governments never intended to leave the interpretation of their statutes to federal
agencies. Courts should deny deference to agency interpretations of state law, just as
they would deny deference to agency interpretations of federal statutes that they are
not responsible for administering.'
Moreover, Congress cannot delegate to agencies the authority to interpret state
laws; state courts, not Congress, are the final authority on the interpretation of state
laws. '2 Federal agencies have only those powers delegated to them by Congress, and
Congress cannot delegate powers it does not possess. Because Congress has no au-
thority to interpret state laws, agencies lack that authority as well. 22
Of the three branches of government, only the judiciary is in a position to con-
strue state laws, and then under the most limited of circumstances. Federal courts
interpret state laws only when those laws are tied to a federal question,' or when the
parties before it have diversity of citizenship. Even then, federal courts go to great
effort to avoid passing on state law or reviewing decisions by state courts so as to avoid
intruding in the states' affairs. For example, federal courts routinely abstain from
deciding cases when the state law at issue is uncertain, preferring to certify the state
law questions for a determination by state courts. Indeed, abstention and certification
doctrines are defended as the judicial creation of common law rules necessary to pro-
tect the position of the states in the federal system. 24 Federal courts abstain so that the
states can interpret their laws, which promotes harmony between state and federal
120 Courts do not owe deference to an agency's interpretation of statutes that are "outside the agency's
particular expertise and special management charge to administer." Professional Reactor Operator Soc. v. U.S.
NRC, 939, F.2d 1047,1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting deference for NRC's interpretation of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act).
2 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
122 See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (holding that a state's highest
courts are final interpreters on questions of state law).
23 See, e.g., Indiana ex reL. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938); Broad River Power Co. v. South
Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930); Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
124 See Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is WrongAbout Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097 (1985).
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courts. 2 As Justice Frankfurter wrote when the Court first established the practice of
abstention, "few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal
chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies."' 26
Federal agencies' interpretations of state laws raise the same federalism concerns
that motivated the federal courts to develop the abstention and certification doctrines.
Every time an agency concludes that a state law must be preempted because it is in
conflict with federal law, or because it stands as an obstacle to the achievement of a
federal purpose, the agency has made a determination regarding the scope and effect
of the state law. Just like courts, agencies risk misinterpreting state laws, creating
needless friction between state and federal governments.
D. Congressional Intent
Chevron deference also has been justified as a means of realizing congressional
intent. Proponents of this theory argue that Congress intended agencies, not courts, to
fill the gaps in ambiguous or silent statutes. This theory is most persuasive when an
agency is interpreting an ambiguous word or phrase in a statute that relates directly to
its area of expertise. For example, it makes sense to conclude that Congress intended
the Environmental Protection Agency, and not the federal courts, to determine the
exact compass of the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977.27 The same assumption does not apply to agency preemption determinations.
As discussed above, agencies are not experts in determining the scope of state laws, or
if those laws conflict with federal law or pose an obstacle to the achievement of a
federal purpose. Determining when and if statutes conflict for preemption purposes is
the type of question that courts, not agencies, are best positioned to address. More-
over, agencies have an institutional interest in deciding the question in favor of pre-
emption, for then the agency establishes itself as the sole authority in its field. Consid-
ering the lack of agency expertise in determining whether preemption of state law is
required, combined with the risk of agency aggrandizement, it is far from clear that
Congress intended agencies, not courts, to make preemption determinations.
E. Guidelines for Judicial Review
A comparison of the rationales underlying the presumption against preemption and
Chevron deference reveals that courts should modify the usual rule of deference when
reviewing agency preemption determinations. Below are guidelines for judicial review
of agency preemption determination that were derived from the previous analysis.
1. As a threshold matter, if an agency asserts a right to preempt a state law, courts
should not grant deference unless the agency has articulated its position formally,
through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Otherwise, the legislative and executive
branches, and the states, are left without a voice in the agency's decision, undermin-
ing the structural safeguards of federalism.
2. Even when acting through formal rulemaking, however, agencies are less
susceptible to the states' influence than Congress because they are one step removed
from political process, and thus agencies are less accountable to state interests. Ac-
cordingly, courts should not accept an agency's assertion of preemptive power without
.25 See Davies, Pullman and Btfbrd Abstention: Clariing the Roles of Federal and State Courts in
Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1986).
126 Hines, 312 U.S. at 396, 500.
"7 Pub. L. No. 95-95,91 Stat. 685.
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first determining, independent of the agency's view of things, if Congress intended
the agency to have such power. If courts defer to any reasonable agency position, as
Chevron dictates, states would lose some of the protections of the political safeguards
of federalism.
An agency's natural desire to expand its authority is another reason for courts to
review agency preemption determinations with concern. When agencies conclude that
they are authorized to preempt state laws, courts should keep in mind that agencies
may be acting out of self-interest, rather than a principled belief that preemption is
necessary. Courts should retain a degree of skepticism when reviewing the validity of
regulatory preemption.
3. Nonetheless, courts should continue to give some degree of deference to some
parts of an agencies' preemption analysis. To determine the preemptive effect of fed-
eral law, courts and agencies must conduct a three-part review. They must: a) deter-
mine the scope of the federal law at issue, b) analyze the state law that allegedly is
preempted, and c) determine the extent to which they are in tension.'28 Agency views
on each of these questions should be granted varying degrees of consideration by a
reviewing court.
a) Courts should continue to give some degree of deference - even if not full-
fledged Chevron deference - to agencies' conclusions regarding the scope of their
governing statute and implementing regulations. The principles of Chevron apply to
an agency's construction of its statute and regulations; an agency is better positioned
than a court to make judgments about the extent of its regulatory authority because it
has more expertise and experience in the area, and because Congress likely intended
that the agency, not the court, make the determination.
b) Reviewing courts, however, should not rely on agencies when conducting the
second step of the preemption review. Agencies are no more expert in interpreting
state laws than they are in interpreting federal statutes that they are not charged with
administering. Moreover, Congress has no authority to interpret state laws; therefore,
it cannot delegate that power to federal agencies.
c) The third step of judicial review requires comparing state law to federal law
and determining if state law must give way. Courts should not defer to an agency's
conclusions that federal and state laws conflict. Agencies have no expertise in making
such determinations, nor is this the kind of decision that Congress should be encour-
aged to leave to agencies to decide. By deferring to an agency's determination that
state law is in conflict with federal law, rather than reaching that conclusion on their
own, courts are saying that although a finding of preemption is reasonable, it is not
the only possible conclusion. In fact, by deferring to the agency's interpretation, courts
leave agencies free to change their minds, deciding in the next administration that the
statute does not preempt the state law at issue after all. If agencies do vacillate, the
states are in limbo, never sure which of their laws will be preempted.
All federalism concerns can be set aside when agencies conclude that federal and
state laws do not conflict. Chevron requires courts to defer to such decisions as long
as they are reasonable. If the agency's determination not to preempt is reasonable,
then the presumption against preemption also favors deference to the agency. In such
situations, the doctrines of Chevron deference and the presumption against preemp-
tion operate in tandem, each providing independently valid reasons for deferring to
the agency's conclusion that preemption is not required.
12 See Teper, 82 F.3d at 993.
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V. APPLYING THE GUIDELINES: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FDA
PREEMPTION DETERMINATIONS
These guidelines resolve some of the questions raised by courts and litigants con-
cerning the degree of deference that should be given to FDA preemption determina-
tions. In Medtronic v. Lohr the majority fell short of asserting the two-step Chevron
analysis, although it did profess to give FDA's narrow interpretation of the express
preemption provision "substantial weight." Seizing on the majority's hesitancy, the
dissent questioned whether deference is appropriate at all in the area of preemption.
Although the dissent correctly noted that Chevron deference and preemption are some-
times in conflict, Lohr was not such a case. In Lohr, FDA argued against preemption
of state law. FDA clearly stated its position both in its regulation and in the amicus
curiae brief that it filed with the Court.'29 Thus, there was no reason not to grant FDA
Chevron deference.
FDA's regulation in Lohr did not tell the Court when preemption of state law is
required, but instead merely delineated the scope of the express preemption provision
in its governing statute. FDA interpreted the preemption provision narrowly, con-
cluding that:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and Drug
Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are
other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act,
thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable
to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug
Administration requirements. 30
Under FDA's view, expressed in its regulation, the "different from or in addition
to requirement" applies only in the narrow circumstances stated in its regulation. This
view assists a reviewing court's understanding of the scope of the express preemption
provision, and should be given Chevron deference. The agency is the expert in deter-
mining the scope and effect of its governing statute, and is in a better position than a
reviewing court to determine Congress' intent in enacting the express preemption
provision. Moreover, because FDA's interpretation of the preemption provision is a
narrow one, there is no fear that the agency's view is biased in its own favor. Finally,
FDA's narrow interpretation is the safest one for the court to adopt. If the agency is
wrong, Congress' intentions have not been realized, but the court and FDA have not
committed constitutional error. On the other hand, if courts adopt a broader interpre-
tation of the preemption provision than Congress intended, the states' Tenth Amend-
ment right to govern their affairs has been violated. It is better for courts to err on the
side of misinterpreting the statute than impinging on states' autonomy.
FDA's regulations narrowly interpreting the express preemption provision com-
prise one aspect of the agency's role in determining if and when state laws concerning
medical devices are preempted. In the Medical Device Amendments, Congress gave
FDA the unusual task of prescreening state laws to determine whether or not they are
preempted by the FDCA.13' Even if a state or local requirement is preempted, states
21 C.F.R. § 808. 1(d); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting respondent/cross-peti-
tioner, Lohr, 518 U.S. 470.
131121 C.F.R. § 808.1(d).
'31 Id. § 808.1(e).
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and localities may apply to FDA for exemptions from preemption under section 360k(b)
of title 21 of the United States Code. At its discretion, FDA may allow a state law to
stand that otherwise would have been preempted, as long as the state requirement is
"more stringent" than federal requirements, or an exemption is required by compel-
ling local conditions and compliance with the requirement would not cause the device
to be in violation of any federal requirements. 3 2 States may petition for an exemption
before their laws go into effect, and thus before there has been any conflict between
federal and state law. In short, section 360k(b) gives FDA the task of "vetting" state
laws to determine first whether they are preempted, and second whether they merit an
exemption from the preemption provision - even before any conflict between state
and federal law has arisen.
FDA has enacted regulations detailing its procedures for reviewing applications
under section 360k(b) for exemption from preemption. First, FDA analyzes the state
law or local requirement at issue. FDA does not limit its analysis to the "literal lan-
guage" of the state law, but instead looks at "how the requirement is interpreted and
applied."' 33 To aid in the endeavor, FDA requires that states submitting their laws for
review send relevant background material, including legislative histories, hearing re-
ports, and any other information that will "enable the Commissioner to determine the
intent of the State or local ordinance or statute."'3 When considering a formal appli-
cation for exemption from preemption, FDA requires the submission of all the mate-
rials listed above, with a letter to the Commissioner signed by an individual autho-
rized to request the exemption on behalf of the state or political subdivision.'35 FDA
will not issue its decision until after holding a public hearing and permitting the
public to comment on the application.
FDA has a separate and less formal procedure for issuing advisory opinions con-
cerning the preemption of state or local regulations. Upon request by any "interested
person," FDA will review a state or local regulation - even if it is not yet law - and
issue an advisory opinion predicting if the requirement will be preempted.'36 FDA
does not require the "interested person" to submit all the materials required for a
formal application for exemption from preemption. Although these advisory opinions
lack the force of law of a section 360k(b) determination, at the Commissioner's dis-
cretion, a request for an advisory opinion also can be treated as a formal application
for an exemption from preemption.'
If a case arises concerning a statute that FDA already has analyzed under section
360k(b), reviewing courts must decide what weight to give FDA determinations. For
the reasons discussed in part IV, FDA's conclusions regarding the meaning of state
statutes and local ordinances are entitled to no deference by a reviewing court. In
attempting to determine how a statute or ordinance operates, FDA is performing the
task of a state court or state agency, but without the experience or information of those
institutions. Moreover, if FDA has been asked to issue an advisory opinion by some-
one who is not a state or local official, to grant FDA's review Chevron deference
would be inappropriate. Such an advisory opinion can be issued before the state or
local law goes into effect, and thus before the state has had an opportunity to educate
the agency regarding its intended application. In addition, the more informal advisory
132 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b).
133 43 Fed. Reg. 18,661, 18,663 (1978).
" 42 Fed. Reg. 30,383, 30,385 (June 14, 1977).
135 Id. at 30,385.
136 Id.
137 ld.
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opinion process does not ensure that the agency has all the relevant information about
the state law before making its decision. Finally, the informality of FDA's review
means that the state may not have an opportunity to participate in the agency's
decisionmaking.
Although courts should not defer to FDA's construction of state law, deference
should be given to FDA conclusions that state and federal law do not conflict, even if
FDA might have misconstrued state law in the process. If FDA reads a state law
narrowly to avoid preemption, then it has acted as courts do when faced with constitu-
tionally troubling legislation. Courts prefer to interpret statutes so as to uphold them,
even if the interpretation is somewhat strained, and courts should allow agencies to do
the same. Until a state makes it clear that FDA's interpretation is wrong, FDA's read-
ing of a state law should stand.
Even though deference should not be granted to FDA preemption determinations
under section 360k(b), that is not to say that the process set up under section 360k(b)
is illegitimate. To the contrary, the process allows FDA to exempt certain state laws
from preemption, and thereby avoid the necessity for judicial intervention. In addi-
tion, the advisory process is beneficial to the states, which get the opportunity to
prescreen potentially conflicting legislation with FDA and perhaps alter the law to
meet FDA's concerns before final enactment. These benefits, however, do not mean
that courts should defer to FDA conclusions regarding state laws or the existence of a
conflict, when the federal courts themselves would have decided the issue differently.
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